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n the run-up to its enactment, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA)1 elicited howls of protest from opponents who 
claimed the federal government was taking over the American 
 
∗ Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, 
Saint Louis University School of Law.  This Article grew out of the American Antitrust 
Institute’s 11th Annual Conference, Are the Boundaries Between Public and Private in 
Transition?  Many thanks to the AAI and Bert Foer for focusing national attention on 
antitrust policy. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
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healthcare system, micromanaging medicine, and generally exposing 
the nation to the bête noire of socialized medicine.2  Hyperbole, 
misrepresentation, and chauvinism aside,3 these sound bites suffer 
from a deeper flaw: they mischaracterize the fundamental thrust of the 
new law.  Though the ACA establishes significant new regulatory 
authority, this is not a new development (indeed it can be faulted for 
preserving pre-existing regulatory regimes), nor does it impair market 
competition.  To the contrary, much of the law aims at improving 
conditions conducive to effective competition.  With numerous 
programs designed to correct perverse incentives in the payment 
system, to mitigate market imperfections, and to make the delivery 
system responsive to market signals, the ACA might well be 
rechristened as the “Accommodation of Competition Act.” 
That said, it is far from clear that market competition will work out 
as scripted by theorists and proponents of the new law.  Myriad 
market imperfections still complicate market interactions, and 
regulations need to be carefully tailored to assure effective 
implementation and to minimize unintended consequences.  Of even 
greater concern are the problematic market structures that pervade 
provider and payer markets.  Concentration, embedded practices, and 
professional norms may cause markets to operate suboptimally even 
 
2 See, e.g., Jim Meyers, Kit Bond: Obamacare’s Financial Cost to States Will Be 
‘Horrific,’ NEWSMAX.COM (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.newsmax.com/Headline/bond      
-healthcare-states-mandates/2010/03/22/id/353529 (quoting Republican Senator Kit Bond 
stating that passage of the health care reform bill sets the stage for turning the United 
States into a socialist country); SenJimDeMint, DeMint Speech Against Socialized 
Medicine, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RPOwGT 
v6uQ (“[W]e’re turning this country into a socialistic style of government taking away 
peoples’ freedom.  . . .  This is a decision to become more like socialized Europe to sell out 
our freedoms to give government control of our health care.”).  Such claims are not new.  
Speaking against an early version of the Medicare legislation in 1962, Ronald Reagan 
warned, “One of the traditional methods of imposing statism or socialism on a people has 
been by way of medicine.  It’s very easy to disguise a medical program as a humanitarian 
project.”  Wyattmcintyre, Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRdLpem-AAs&playnext 
=1&list=PL52AA90A05E7AE899. 
3 Leading in the hyperbole department was Rush Limbaugh.  See Pharmacist, Rush 
Limbaugh Quotes on Obamacare, HUBPAGES, http://hubpages.com/hub/Rush-Limbaugh   
-Quotes-on-Obamacare (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (“America is hanging by a thread,” and 
“[President Obama’s] desire is to have as many people on federal dependency as 
possible.”).  Less than temperate assessments could be heard on the floor of the Senate as 
well, such as Senator Tom Coburn’s statement, “[to] our seniors . . . I have a message for 
you: [if the health care bill passes] you’re gonna die sooner.”  MediaMattersAction, Sen. 
Coburn’s Message to Seniors: “You’re Going to Die Sooner,” YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=B_U1mQF9ZCw. 
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if reform is implemented smoothly.  Finally, the ACA’s effectiveness 
in achieving its goals depends on the executive branch’s maintaining 
a steady hand in countless regulatory determinations.  This Article 
surveys some of the misconceptions about health reform and the 
challenges proponents confront in realizing their goals. 
I 
HEALTH CARE: REGULATION, DEREGULATION, AND REREGULATION 
Regulation in one form or another has long guided the 
development of health care markets in the United States.  In certain 
respects, government regulation and private self-regulation have 
worked hand in hand.  For many years, a “professional paradigm” 
prevailed, under which physicians effectively controlled payment 
systems, health care institutions, and conditions of entry.4  Physician 
norms, ethical codes, and rules governing behavior in payment and 
delivery settings effectively established a system of self-regulation.  
These institutional and social structures found support in legal 
regimes that reinforced their authority.  For example, laws exempting 
hospitals from federal and state taxation provided physicians access to 
free capital and enabled them to exercise control over the operations 
of those organizations.5  Licensure, accreditation, and certificate of 
need (CON) laws reduced supply, limited rivalry, and set terms 
governing the conditions of competition in the professions and among 
hospitals.6 Numerous other laws and conditions of payment have 
 
4 The seminal work on professional dominance is PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).  See also CARL F. AMERINGER, THE 
HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY TO MARKET COMPETITION 
(2008) (tracing evolution in law and norms leading to market-based health policy). 
5 See Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry? 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980). 
6 See ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, 
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 19–40 (2007) (describing the scope and history of 
regulation of professionals); id. at 41–73 (discussing regulation of hospitals and other 
institutions); see also James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of 
Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
1459, 1470 (1994) (concluding that the accreditation standards of the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (now called the Joint Commission)—which are 
given deemed status for hospital certification under Medicare—“institutionalize physician 
autonomy within hospitals by requiring that the medical staff have an independent 
organization and structure”). 
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served to cement professional judgments and limit consumers’ 
abilities to make desired trade-offs between costs and benefits.7 
To be sure, legal doctrine has also directly shaped the development 
of health care organizations and reimbursement.  The rapid expansion 
of hospitals following World War II is in part attributable to the Hill 
Burton Act, which provided $3.7 billion in funding between 1947 and 
1971 for hospital construction and imposed important and long-
lasting obligations to provide charity care on grant recipients.8  
Perhaps most significantly, in setting the conditions for 
reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid, the federal government 
has exerted significant control over the structure of provider 
organizations, their internal operations, and the nature and volume of 
services that are provided.9  States have wide authority to regulate 
hospitals under the police power, and they exercise that authority 
through licensure, which imposes specific operational, clinical, and 
administrative requirements on practitioners.  The era of regulation 
reached its zenith in 1974 with the National Health Resources 
Planning and Development Act, which sought to develop standards 
for controlling the supply, distribution, and organization of health 
resources, especially acute care hospitals.10  That law created 
incentives for states to establish state health planning and 
development agencies to adopt health-planning strategies and to enact 
CON laws to assure an appropriate distribution of resources pursuant 
to the state plan.11  Although the federal planning law was repealed in 
1986, thirty-six states continue to operate CON regulatory schemes 
that require prior approval for various undertakings, such as new 
hospital construction or expansion and significant capital 
investments.12  During this era, over thirty states also engaged in 
 
7 See Symposium, Who Pays? Who Benefits? Distributional Issues in Health Care, 69 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 1. 
8 See FIELD, supra note 6, at 56–57. 
9 See id. at 58–60 (describing the “profound effect” on hospitals of Medicare’s change 
to prospective payment); id. at 34 (oversight authority of Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services “effectively makes Medicare another arbiter of physician quality”). 
10 National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (repealed 1987). 
11 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 32–36 (2d ed. 2000).  Prior approval by a 
state agency empowered to issue a CON was required for all new institutional health 
services (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, and ambulatory surgery centers) and for all capital 
expenditures in excess of $150,000.  Id. 
12 Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health 
/CONCertificateofNeedStateLaws/tabid/14373/Default.aspx. 
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direct regulation of hospital rates, many using prospective payment 
methodologies to assert control over explosive growth in costs 
attributable to fee-for-service payments.13 
Regulation of private insurance has long been the province of the 
states, which typically exercise control over capitalization, solvency, 
mandated services and providers, marketing, and claims processing, 
but states generally do not engage in direct rate regulation.14  
However, federal authority over private insurance has also been 
exercised on numerous occasions.  The Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) Act of 1973 required employers offering health 
insurance to include an HMO in the options offered to employees, and 
it provided subsidies for HMOs that met detailed standards regarding 
coverage, physician networks, and patient appeals.15  Over the last 
twenty years, the federal government has expanded its role, requiring 
insurers to offer coverage in certain circumstances16 and placing 
specific requirements on their handling of information and new 
technology.17  Significant legal regimes, including fraud and abuse 
laws, false claims laws, and the Stark law, emerged as necessary to 
police abuse arising from the perverse incentives of fee-for-service 
medicine.18  Likewise, the prevalence of tax-exempt institutions 
delivering health care services gave rise to a large body of federal and 
state law that governs the charitable practices of those institutions and 
restricts diversion of their assets to private interests.  In the 1990s, 
states responded to perceived abuses and consumer dissatisfaction 
with managed care by unleashing a new wave of regulations that 
 
13 See John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 
HEALTH AFF. 142, 142 (1997). 
14 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 
654 (6th ed. 2008). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9 (2006). 
16 Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 
Stat. 1874.  Congress required temporary continuation of group health coverage for 
employees who lose coverage through termination of employment.  See FURROW ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 751–52. 
17 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, established minimum federal standards and requirements 
concerning guaranteed issue and renewability of health coverage, prohibited 
discrimination based on health factors, and limited disclosure of personal information.  
With the OBRA of 1986, Congress required continuation of group health coverage under 
certain circumstances.  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 14. 
18 These laws share a common purpose of curbing incentives for providers to bill, refer, 
and practice medicine in a manner that serves their own interests to the detriment of 
consumer welfare.  See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 1023–94. 
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provided patients rights of appeal and other processes, that mandated 
coverage of specific services and inclusion of certain providers, and 
that regulated many other aspects of managed care.19  The federal-
state regulatory borders have frequently been a source of conflict.  
Significantly, federal law preempts much state regulation that would 
apply to self-insured employers, essentially creating a dual regulatory 
system in which state regulation imposes stringent limitations on 
some plans while others enjoy what has come to be known as a 
regulatory “vacuum.”20 
Thus, regulation of health care providers and payers historically 
has been something of a roller coaster ride.  The era of self-regulation 
(supported by government deference and facilitating law) lasted until 
the 1970s when direct intervention became more common.  State and 
federal governments stepped up their efforts to control costs and 
restrict the supply of health resources, but they never fully supplanted 
private markets.  As dissatisfaction with “command-and-control” 
regulation grew in the 1980s, what came to be known as the 
“competitive revolution” began, and antitrust laws helped depose 
private regulatory regimes while CON statutes and other laws were 
repealed or fell into disuse.21  Again, however, this “revolution” never 
amounted to a coup d’état.  Government supervision of providers 
under Medicare and Medicaid payment policies intensified, and laws 
necessary to encourage managed care as envisioned by its principal 
theorists22 never were adopted.  A counterrevolution ensued as public 
dissatisfaction with managed care and the defeat of the Clinton 
administration health reforms (which ironically fell victim to 
perceptions of being overly regulatory but in fact relied heavily on 
managed care theory) signaled to politicians and insurers that it was 
time to back off managing care.  Numerous laws and judicial 
interpretations restricted managed care, as a “managed care backlash” 
 
19 See Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 427 (2005); Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy 
Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 365 (2003). 
20 See Andrew L. Oringer, A Regulatory Vacuum Leaves Gaping Wounds—Can 
Common Sense Offer a Better Way to Address the Pain of ERISA Preemption?, 26 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 409 (2008). 
21 See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 55. 
22 E.g., Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now 
What?, 28 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE w3-237, available at http://content 
.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.237v1/DC1. 
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imposed regulatory obstacles that impeded the market-based approach 
to health care. 
What messages might be gleaned from the ebb and flow of 
regulatory activity?  The nation has been ambivalent about the role of 
competition in health care but, at the same time, has resisted 
command-and-control regulation, at least to the extent that such 
regulation was apparent to it.  While policy makers have broadly 
endorsed market-based approaches, they have been reluctant to 
provide the legal infrastructure necessary for effective competition 
and have cluttered the landscape with a maze of complex and 
conflicting laws and regulations. 
II 
THE CASE FOR COMPETITION-FOSTERING REGULATION 
Justification for regulation to promote competition can be found in 
virtually every economic analysis of health care.  Markets for 
providing and financing health care are beset with myriad market 
imperfections: inadequate information, agency, moral hazard, 
monopoly, and selection in insurance markets that greatly distort 
markets.  Add to that governmental failures—for example, payment 
systems that reward intensity and volume but not accountability for 
resources or outcomes, restrictions on referrals that impede efficient 
cooperation among providers, and entry impediments in the form of 
licensure and CON—and toss in a strain of professional norms that 
are highly resistant to marketplace incentives, and you have the root 
causes of our broken system. 
A.  Economic Theory: Coping with Market Failure in Health Care 
Since Kenneth Arrow’s seminal 1963 essay,23 economic analyses 
have properly focused on the significant market failures that beset 
health care markets.  Arrow’s principal culprits, “uncertainty in the 
incidence of disease and in the efficacy of treatment,” information 
asymmetries between patient and physician, and the 
“nonmarketability of the bearing of suitable risks” still collude to 
prevent optimal resource allocation.24  Though differing to some 
 
23 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941 (1963). 
24 Id. at 947 (“The failure of one or more of the competitive preconditions has as its 
most immediate and obvious consequence a reduction in welfare below that obtainable 
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extent in the severity to which they attach individual failures and the 
extent to which social institutions may rectify problems, health 
economists uniformly stress that information, agency, and insurance 
vastly complicate applying microeconomic principles to analyze the 
welfare effects of transactions or policy changes.25  While the causes 
of market failure may be defined in several ways,26 four factors 
appear to have the greatest impact: information deficits, product 
differentiation, agency relationships, and insurance market 
imperfections. 
First, asymmetries in information and uncertainty as to diagnosis, 
treatment, and outcome are critical to understanding the health care 
marketplace.  A variety of circumstances undermine the neoclassical 
assumption that buyers and sellers possess adequate information to 
assess the quality and costs of the services provided.  Because of the 
technical nature of medical information and the complexity of 
diagnoses and treatment alternatives, patients and third-party payers 
find it difficult to evaluate the cost and quality of health services.  
Indeed, the considerable uncertainty that attends medical treatment 
makes judgments on causation (and hence costs and benefits of the 
treatment) difficult.  In addition, information is asymmetrically 
distributed among providers, patients, and payers.  This characteristic 
may permit physicians to induce demand for their services, and at a 
minimum, it makes information costly for buyers to acquire.27 
 
from existing resources and technology, in the sense of a failure to reach an optimal state 
in the sense of Pareto.”). 
25 A leading text summarizes market failure in health care as follows: 
Health markets fail to satisfy the substantial list of requirements that must be met 
to be classified as perfectly competitive: large numbers of consumers and firms, 
free entry and exit, marketability of all goods and services including risk, 
symmetric information with zero search costs, and no increasing returns, 
externalities, or collusion. While health markets satisfy none of these 
requirements fully, they fail the requirements of symmetric information, zero 
search costs, and the marketability of all products most dramatically. 
David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care 
Markets, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH AND ECONOMICS 1093, 1095 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. 
Newhouse eds., 2000). 
26 Id.; see also THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 235, 235–41 (David R. 
Henderson ed., 2008); PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 468–74 (5th ed. 
1999). 
27 Although the phenomenon of demand inducement has generated considerable debate 
over its extent and definition, economists broadly concur that physicians exert their power 
to supply services beyond the level that would be demanded by fully informed consumers.  
See Henry J. Aaron, To Find the Answer, One Must Know the Question: Health Economics 
and Public Policy, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE 21, 30 (Frank A. Sloan 
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Second, product differentiation among physicians and hospitals 
along a number of dimensions is widely recognized.28  Hospitals vary 
widely based on quality, reputation, geographic location, amenities, 
and other features.  Likewise, physicians are differentiated by their 
training, reputations, locations, hospital affiliation, and many other 
aspects.  On the demand side, the heterogeneous preferences of 
consumers are manifest, with varying preferences or “tastes” for 
travel, amenities, reputation, and “caring” service.  These preferences 
interact with heterogeneous product characteristics in health services 
to contribute to reducing substitutability among providers of 
essentially the same services.29  The quality of services sold by health 
care providers also may vary considerably, depending upon the 
professionals’ talents, training, attention to interpersonal 
relationships, communication skills, and other factors.  Product 
differentiation that grows out of the heterogeneity of consumer 
preferences is a source of market power in health services markets.30  
Finally, sellers of health services are subject to impediments to 
mobility, both in the form of regulatory entry barriers imposed by 
governmental licensure and private certification and practice 
requirements and in the form of switching costs, such as those 
resulting from steep learning curves and changing technology. 
Third, agency relationships, which pervade health markets, are 
highly influential in health care transactions.31  A large majority of 
consumers (patients) purchase health care through multiple agents—
 
& Hirschel Kasper eds., 2008) (“[I]f physicians are willing to do more of certain things 
when paid well to do them, it is hard to see why the idea that physicians might induce 
demand was ever controversial.”). 
28 See Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, Antitrust and Competition in Health Care 
Markets, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 25, at 1405, 1410–12.  See 
generally Seth Sacher & Louis Silvia, Antitrust Issues in Defining the Product Market for 
Hospital Services, 5 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 181 (1998). 
29 See Gaynor & Vogt, supra note 28, at 1411. 
30 See id. 
It is th[e] combination of a heterogeneous product with heterogeneous 
preferences which is key.  . . .  [T]his bestows the seller with market power.  
Patients choose sellers who produce the type of services and have characteristics 
which best match their preferences.  The fact that patients choose sellers who 
give them the highest utility gives sellers market power, since switching to 
another seller will reduce a patient’s utility. 
Id.; see also Mark A. Satterthwaite, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price 
and the Number of Sellers, 10 BELL J. ECON. 483 (1979). 
31 Lawrence Casalino, Managing Uncertainty: Intermediate Organizations as Triple 
Agents, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1055, 1055–57 (2001). 
GREANEY 4/5/2011  3:15 PM 
820 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 811 
their employers, the plans or insurers chosen by their employers, and 
the physicians who guide patient choice through referrals and the 
selection of treatment modalities.  For most consumers, choice is 
limited to a small number of plans; most small employers offer only 
one plan, and large employers rarely offer more than three.32  The 
number of plans and benefits offered by each employer is strongly 
affected by the possibility of risk selection and the employer’s 
transaction costs in administering health plan coverage.  Thus, to 
some extent, the employer acts as an agent for its employees in 
purchasing health insurance by choosing plans that afford the mix of 
quality, price, and geographic coverage that best suits most of its 
employees.  This multiplicity of agents greatly complicates antitrust 
analyses of consumer behavior and is a principal source of market 
failure in health care.33 
Health insurance markets also exhibit conditions that give rise to 
market failures.  Moral hazard, for example, refers to the overuse of 
medical care resulting from the fact that insurance lowers the cost of 
each purchase for insureds.  Overuse causes inefficiency, as insured 
individuals purchase more services than they would if they had to 
bear the entire cost; hence, true marginal costs exceed marginal 
benefits.34  Risk selection also may undermine health insurance 
markets.  That is, insurers have strong incentives to seek a favorable, 
or low-risk, pool of insureds.  Acting on that incentive can cause an 
unraveling of risk spreading as the sick and the healthy become 
divided into different market segments.35  By the same token, adverse 
selection may occur as patients switch plans and adjust coverage 
according to anticipated needs. 
 
32 See Alain Enthoven, Managed Competition of Delivery Systems, 13 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 305 (1988). 
33 See Casalino, supra note 31, at 1061–62.  Gaynor and Vogt summarize the multiple 
agent relationship: “In practice hospital choice is a complex combination of the 
consumer’s choice of health plan, the health plan’s choice of providers to contract with, 
the consumer’s choice of physician, and the consumer-physician-health plan choice of 
whether and where to admit the consumer.”  Gaynor & Vogt, supra note 28, at 1431. 
34 Seminal contributions on moral hazard are by Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of 
Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968), and Mark V. Pauly, 
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and 
Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44 (1974).  Analysts question the extent and welfare 
effects of moral hazard in health care.  See, e.g., John A. Nyman, The Economics of Moral 
Hazard Revisited, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 811 (1999); see also Malcom Gladwell, The 
Moral-Hazard Myth, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at 44. 
35 See David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-off 
Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q.J ECON. 433, 434 (1998). 
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B.  Structure and Performance 
Turning to the structure and performance of health care markets, 
one finds additional evidence that conditions precedent for effective 
competition are lacking and that markets have fallen short of 
advancing consumer welfare.  In short, as I have suggested elsewhere, 
provider markets evidence the worst of both worlds—hospital and 
physician markets that are both concentrated and fragmented.36  
Owing in part to several misguided court decisions and the enforcers’ 
seven-year hiatus on challenging hospital mergers, hospital markets 
have become highly concentrated around the country.  By one 
estimate, ninety-three percent of the nation’s 2006 population lived in 
concentrated hospital markets.37  Further, abundant evidence shows 
that consumers have borne the brunt of hospitals’ exercise of market 
power.  The Synthesis Project’s summary of empirical studies of the 
effects of hospital consolidation in the 1990s indicates that 
anticompetitive horizontal mergers raised overall inpatient prices by 
at least five percent and by forty percent or more when merging 
hospitals were closely located.38 
The causal connection between provider concentration and 
increasing health care costs finds further support in an important 
study by the Attorney General of Massachusetts.  The report, which 
closely examined private insurance prices, offers a number of 
significant conclusions.39  First, it found that prices paid to hospitals 
and physicians vary significantly and that higher prices are not 
associated with quality, complexity, proportion of government 
patients, or academic status.40  Second, provider prices in 
Massachusetts are correlated to market leverage.41  Hospitals and 
physician groups with bargaining power extracted higher prices that 
are not explained by the factors mentioned above.  Third, more 
 
36 Thomas (Tim) Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in 
Health Care, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 231–35 (2009). 
37 CLAUDIA H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS 
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE 2 
(2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9policybrief.pdf. 
38 Id. 
39 OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY OF MASS., EXAMINATION OF 
HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (2010), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/healthcare/final_report_w_cover_appendices_glossary  
.pdf. 
40 Id. at 3. 
41 Id. at 7–9. 
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expensive providers appear to gain market share at the expense of less 
expensive providers.42  Fourth, the report concluded that a variety of 
contractual devices, such as payment parity agreements and product 
participation provisions, have reinforced and perpetuated pricing 
disparities.43 
Another study, drawing on site visits by the Center for Studying 
Health System Change to six California markets in 2008, found that 
provider leverage has had a “major impact on California premium 
trends.”44  Interviews in these markets revealed that the bargaining 
power of hospitals has been enhanced by extensive horizontal 
consolidation.  Consolidation and other factors, such as system 
bargaining on an all-or-nothing basis, led to a sharp increase in the 
number of “must have” facilities in the state.45  In addition, large, 
multispecialty group practices and independent practice associations 
also exercise market power by virtue of a lack of price competition 
for their services.  In a remarkable twist, the study found some 
situations in which the market power of large groups outweighed the 
advantages for health plans of entering into capitation for insurers.46 
Other, subtler results have also flowed from the wave of 
consolidations and the marginalization of managed care.  Besides 
price increases owing to enhanced bargaining power, growth in 
hospital costs appear to have been driven by strategic decisions that 
take advantage of market imperfections and the absence of effective 
monitoring by payers.  By some accounts, the “medical arms race” 
has resurfaced.47  That is, hospitals have undertaken significant 
expansions in high-margin services and have accelerated technology 
acquisitions, a phenomenon attributable in part to providers’ capacity 
to induce demand. 
Concentrated private-provider markets also impact government 
payers.  Examining the effect of hospital concentration on Medicare 
payments, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) 
has found that high hospital margins on private-payer patients tend to 
 
42 Id. at 38–40. 
43 Id. at 40–43. 
44 Robert Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows 
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 704 (2010). 
45 Id. at 702. 
46 Id. at 703–04 
47 See Robert A. Berenson et al., Hospital-Physician Relations: Cooperation, 
Competition, or Separation?, 26 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE w31 (2006), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w31.full.pdf. 
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induce more construction and higher hospital costs and that, “when 
non-Medicare margins are high, hospitals face less pressure to 
constrain costs, [and] costs rise.”48  These factors, MedPAC observes, 
explain the counterintuitive phenomenon that hospital Medicare 
margins tend to be low in markets in which concentration is highest, 
while margins are higher in more competitively structured markets.49 
While provider concentration is pervasive, health delivery is also 
highly fragmented.  Primary care practices remain small and isolated 
with little integration or coordination with specialty physician 
practices or between physicians and hospitals.50  Even more damning 
is the fact that vertical integration is also lacking, or as David Hyman 
characterized it, “[h]ospitals and physicians occupy separate 
organizational universes.”51  The case for integrating care across 
physician specialties and institutions rests on evidence of higher 
quality of care, opportunities for deployment of evidence-based 
medicine at the clinical level, and enhanced means of controlling 
costs by locating responsibility with an organization or team of 
accountable providers.52 
The payer side has become more concentrated, at least in the 
individual and small group market, where, according to some data, 
two firms have greater than fifty percent of the market in twenty-two 
states, and one firm has more than fifty percent in seventeen states.53  
The results in these markets appear to confirm what economic theory 
predicts: higher premiums for consumers and high profits for the 
insurance industry.  Summarizing studies indicating that private 
 
48 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING 
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM xiv (2009) available at http://www.medpac 
.gov/documents/mar09_entirereport.pdf. 
49 Id. 
50 See Thomas Bodenheimer, Coordinating Care—A Perilous Journey Through the 
Health Care System, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1064 (2008); Randal Cebul et al., 
Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Health Care System, in THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 55–57 (Einer R. 
Elhauge ed., 2010). 
51 David A. Hyman, Health Care Fragmentation: We Get What We Pay for, in THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 50, at 23. 
52 See Alain C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen, Competition in Health Care: It Takes 
Systems to Pursue Quality and Efficiency, 24 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE w5-420 
(2005), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/09/07/hlthaff.w5 
.420.full.pdf. 
53 Karen Davenport & Sonia Sekhar, Interactive Map: Insurance Market Concentration 
Creates Fewer Choices, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www 
.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/11/insurance_market.html. 
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insurance revenue increased even faster than medical costs, 
economists John Holahan and Linda Blumberg of the Urban Institute 
concluded that “the market power of insurers meant that they were 
not only able to pass on health care costs to purchasers but to increase 
profitability at the same time.”54  While some other studies conclude 
that dominant insurers extract monopoly rents,55 the extent of their 
exercise of market power has been questioned.56  Finally, experience 
suggests that entry into concentrated insurance markets is far from 
easy and may be unlikely to occur in markets with few insurers.  A 
recent study by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
found that entry in such insurance markets was impeded by the 
difficulty of securing provider contracts.57 
The existence of oligopolies or monopolies in both the provider 
and insurance sectors creates opportunities for anticompetitive 
mischief.  As mentioned earlier, dominant hospital systems and 
dominant single-specialty physician groups have been able to charge 
higher prices, which in turn result in higher insurance premiums (and, 
as some studies show, increased disparities in access to care).  But 
 
54 JOHN HOLAHAN & LINDA BLUMBERG, URBAN INST., HEALTH POLICY CTR., CAN A 
PUBLIC INSURANCE PLAN INCREASE COMPETITION AND LOWER THE COSTS OF HEALTH 
CARE REFORM? 3 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/health_policy/url.cfm?ID 
=411762. 
55 Leemore S. Dafny, Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?, 100 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1399 (2010) (finding that health insurers charge higher premiums to more profitable 
firms, suggesting that they possess and exercise market power). 
56 E.g., Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change, Consolidation, and 
Competition in Health Care Markets, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 141 (1999); Martin Gaynor, Why 
Don’t Courts Treat Hospitals Like Tanks for Liquefied Gases? Some Reflections on Health 
Care Antitrust Enforcement, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 497, 507 (2006) (asserting 
“that it is not at all clear that private health insurers systematically possess monopsony 
power”).  The government antitrust enforcement agencies have on occasion opined that 
health insurance markets are generally competitive.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004).  But see 
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
as Prepared for the American Bar Association/American Health Lawyers Association 
Antitrust and Healthcare Conference (May 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov 
/atr/public/speeches/258898.pdf (promising “measured enforcement” of the antitrust laws 
involving the health insurance industry). 
57 The Department of Justice’s study concluded: 
[T]he biggest obstacle to an insurer’s entry or expansion in the small- or mid-
sized-employer market is scale.  New insurers cannot compete with incumbents 
for enrollees without provider discounts, but they cannot negotiate for discounts 
without a large number of enrollees.  This circularity problem makes entry risky 
and difficult, helping to secure the position of existing incumbents. 
Varney, supra note 56, at 9. 
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what happens when dominant insurers face dominant providers—
what economists call bilateral monopoly?  The outcome depends on 
the strategic interactions of the parties.  For example, in the now 
notorious episode involving Partners Health Care and Blue Cross of 
Massachusetts, the parties reached a mutually beneficial 
understanding (a “market covenant”) to maintain high premiums and 
high hospital charges.  More generally, it appears the dynamics of 
bargaining may often result in higher prices for consumers.  As 
Holahan and Blumberg summarized industry tendencies: “Dominant 
insurers do not seem to use their market power to drive hard bargains 
with providers,” but “small insurers do not aggressively compete over 
price.”58  Holahan and Blumberg noted that “rising premiums and 
increased profitability of nondominant firms provide indirect 
evidence of shadow pricing by smaller insurers; that is, smaller 
insurers do not seem to compete on premiums to gain market share 
but rather seem to follow the pricing of the dominant insurer.”59 
In sum, it is hard to ignore the claim that markets as we have 
known them have not performed well.  Whether measured by cost, 
outcomes, or customer satisfaction, the health care industry’s record 
is one that merits intervention.60  The following section assays the 
ACA’s prospects for making improvements by introducing 
regulations that may improve market competiveness. 
III 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN ANTIDOTE TO MARKET 
IMPERFECTIONS 
The ACA’s focus on improving competition is illustrated by the 
steps it takes to establish new markets that facilitate shopping for 
insurance and to mitigate market imperfections.  Though perhaps 
counterintuitive to those who dichotomize between competition and 
regulation, law can sometimes foster competition by imposing rules 
and standards, by mandating purchasing, or by creating competition-
fostering institutions.  As I have argued since the early days of the 
 
58 HOLAHAN & BLUMBERG, supra note 54, at 3. 
59 Id. (footnote omitted). 
60 See Len M. Nichols, Director, Health Policy Program, New Am. Found., Statement 
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Competition in 
the Health Care Marketplace 3 (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.newamerica.net 
/files/NICHOLS_Commerce.pdf (summarizing the costs of noncompetitive pricing, poor 
quality, and inefficiency in health care and concluding “[i]t is not unreasonable to argue 
that we pay roughly 2.4 times more than we should for health care”). 
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“competitive revolution” in health care, such regulation is a condition 
precedent for effective markets.61 
A.  Payment and Insurance Reforms 
Health insurance exchanges, which serve as the centerpiece of the 
ACA’s attempt to move toward universal coverage, are at bottom 
markets for offering and purchasing health insurance.  Like countless 
other forums for exchange, such as farmers’ markets, stock markets, 
or online travel services, health insurance exchanges will afford 
individual consumers and small businesses the opportunity to 
examine and compare alternative insurance options and to purchase 
those that best suit their needs.  The idea is hardly novel.  Its ancestry 
can be traced to the concept of managed competition, as developed by 
economist Alain Enthoven and others,62 and to numerous purchasing 
cooperatives, health alliances, and connectors—among states and 
private entities.63  Past efforts to promote exchanges have floundered, 
however, primarily because of problems of adverse selection and a 
resulting inability to attract sufficiently large pools of customers to 
effectively spread risk.64  The ACA requires that states establish 
individual and small group exchanges in each state,65 and it mandates 
the purchase of insurance by individuals and encourages employers to 
purchase insurance for their employees.  In doing so, lawmakers 
 
61 See Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable 
Revolution, 5 YALE. J. ON REG. 179 (1988) (predicting that competition in health care 
would not succeed if regulation and infrastructure do not support it). 
62 See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and 
Economy, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29 (1989). 
63 See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES (2010), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jul 
/1426_Jost_hlt_insurance_exchanges_ACA.pdf. 
64 Id. at 3 (explaining that unsuccessful exchanges failed to succeed because they 
“attempted to offer better coverage, or more affordable coverage, to too many individuals 
or groups with unfavorable risk profiles and were unable to attract enough healthy 
enrollees”); see also LINDA J. BLUMBERG & KAREN POLLITZ, URBAN INST., ROBERT 
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: ORGANIZING HEALTH 
INSURANCE MARKETPLACES TO PROMOTE HEALTH REFORM GOALS (2009), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411875_health_insurance_marketplaces.pdf. 
65 While mandating that each state establish an exchange for individual purchasers 
(“American Health Benefit Exchange”) and small groups (“SHOP” exchange), the law 
permits states to establish multiple regional exchanges or interstate exchanges.  Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 
173–82 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West 2010)). 
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hoped to create sizeable and stable risk pools that will reduce the risks 
of adverse selection, that will lower marketing and administrative 
costs, and that will enable consumers to have sufficient clout 
bargaining collectively with insurers.  In structuring exchanges, the 
ACA’s drafters were fully cognizant of the need to address market 
imperfections.  For example, the law requires that exchanges establish 
risk-adjustment mechanisms,66 and it bans discrimination based on 
age, disability, or expected length of life.67  Those provisions also 
serve to lessen the risks of favorable selection problems and to 
potentially broaden the size of group and non-group insurance pools.  
In addition, these exchanges can serve to widen choice, improve 
transparency, and reduce search costs for individuals and employers, 
thereby enhancing the efficiency of the market. 
The ACA also addresses insurance market imperfections through 
several prohibitions on specific industry practices.68  For example, it 
sets rules that govern the terms of insurance policies by prohibiting 
much medical underwriting and premium pricing based on health 
status in the small group and non-group markets.69  These changes are 
designed to counter the proclivity of insurers to seek out healthy 
individuals and to mitigate the risk selection phenomenon that impairs 
insurance market efficiency.  In addition, the ACA deals with 
information deficits in several ways.  First, it seeks to increase the 
amount and accessibility of information by requiring exchanges to 
perform a variety of functions, such as establishing a toll-free 
hotline70 and maintaining a Web site that provides standardized 
comparative information on health plans71 and rating plans72 and that 
develops enrollee satisfaction surveys.73  These changes counter well-
documented difficulties encountered in the consumer market 
 
66 Id. §§ 1341–43, 124 Stat. at 208–12 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18061–63 (West 
2010)). 
67 Id. § 2704, 124 Stat. at 323 (codified as note to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West 2010)). 
68 For summaries and analyses of the ACA, see BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH 
REFORM SUPPLEMENT TO HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (2010). 
69 ACA § 2701, 124 Stat. at 317–18 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320b-9b (West 2010)). 
70 Id. § 1311(d)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 176 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4)(B) (West 
2010)). 
71 Id. § 1311(d)(4)(C), 124 Stat. at 176 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4)(B) (West 
2010)). 
72 Id. § 1311(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 175 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(3) (West 
2010)). 
73 Id. § 1311(c)(4), 124 Stat. at 175 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(4) (West 
2010)). 
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regarding the content and quality of health insurance plans.74  Second, 
the ACA sets minimum standards for insurance policies in the 
individual and non-group market by requiring that they cover the 
“essential benefits package” (to be defined by the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)) and that they 
standardize packages of insurance levels of coverage (“precious 
metal” plans).75  In addition, the law imposes a number of limitations 
on the net amount that cost-sharing plans may require,76 and it 
mandates that insurers provide annual rebates to their enrollees if their 
medical loss ratios (the ratio of amounts incurred for claims and paid 
for activities to improve health care quality to total premiums) are less 
than eighty-five percent in the large group market or eighty percent in 
the small group or individual market.77 
These and other measures find support in the necessity of dealing 
with severe information, agency, and behavioral issues described 
earlier.  In insurance markets, not only are policies complicated and 
highly heterogeneous, thus making informed comparisons difficult, 
but also they cause people to rely on unreliable decision aids.  As 
Russell Korobkin has explained,78 evidence drawn from behavioral 
psychology demonstrates that consumers have cognitive limitations 
that can cause them to make decisions in only a “boundedly rational” 
manner, and they use highly imperfect heuristics and other shortcuts 
in their decision making.  As a consequence, they are likely to fail to 
 
74 See Karen Pollitz, Research Professor, Georgetown Univ. Health Policy Inst., 
Addressing Insurance Market Reform in National Health Reform (Mar. 24, 2009). 
75 ACA § 1302, 124 Stat. at 163 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West 2010)).  Health 
plans offered in the individual and small group markets must cover specific percentages of 
actuarial value and are arrayed in “precious metal” categories: bronze plans must cover 
sixty percent of actuarial value, silver plans must cover seventy percent of actuarial value, 
gold plans must cover eighty percent of actuarial value, and platinum plans must cover 
ninety percent of actuarial value.  Insurers may also offer a catastrophic plan to subscribers 
under thirty years of age (for a while the plan was referred to as the “young invincibles” 
plan because it is aimed at attracting younger subscribers inclined to doubt they need 
health insurance).  Id.  The actuarial value of services is essentially the net coverage 
offered by a plan taking into account cost-sharing responsibilities and determined on the 
basis of the average cost of providing the essential benefits to a standard population, not 
the actual population of the plan.  Id. 
76 Id. § 1402, 124 Stat. at 220–24 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (West 2010)). 
77 Id. § 2718(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 886 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A) 
(West 2010)). 
78 See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: 
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(1999); see also Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of 
State Regulation of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 169. 
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make individual health insurance purchasing decisions in a way that 
promotes efficiency.79  Given intractable difficulties of dealing with 
certain issues by contract and the absence of other institutional 
arrangements to assist consumers, legislation mandating coverage 
may be justified in some circumstances. 
For some commentators, the prime culprit distorting markets is the 
moral hazard associated with health insurance.80  Moral hazard 
operates not only in the economic dimension—encouraging 
overconsumption of services—but also in the regulatory area.  Clark 
Havighurst has persuasively argued that consumers/voters in America 
are blinded to implications of costly regulations that inhibit insurers 
from managing care effectively: 
[I]gnorance of the cost of care . . . ensures that neither the choices 
[consumers] make in the marketplace nor the opinions they express 
in the political process reveal their true preferences.  . . .   
 . . .  Even though moral hazard operates with particular 
vengeance in health insurance, it can be managed to some extent . . . 
.  Inefficiency occurs, however, as soon as government or the legal 
system barges in to preclude financing intermediaries from 
effectively managing care—that is, from taking administrative and 
other actions to limit the impact of moral hazard—or requires them 
to honor costly entitlements prescribed by law or professional 
standards rather than set forth in freely negotiated contracts.81 
The ACA attempts to mitigate the moral hazard problem in several 
ways.  First, the so-called “Cadillac Tax”82 operates to reduce 
 
79 These deficiencies have been applied to consumer decision making at the point of 
service in health care.  Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics, in 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 195, 195 (Peter Diamond & Hannu 
Vartiainen eds., 2007).  In addition, there is considerable evidence that behavioral factors 
impair physician decision making.  See Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of 
Physicians: A Behavioral Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189 (2009). 
80 See Havighurst, supra note 21, at 78–82. 
[I]t should be obvious that the market failure most responsible for economic 
inefficiency in the health care sector is not consumers’ ignorance about the 
quality of care, but their ignorance of the cost of care, which ensures that neither 
the choices they make in the marketplace nor the opinions they express in the 
political process reveal their true preferences. 
Id. at 78. 
81 Id. at 78–79. 
82 The ACA imposes a forty percent excise tax on employment-related health coverage 
that costs more than $10,200 for individual coverage or $27,500 for family coverage 
beginning in 2018 subject to various adjustments and exceptions.  Although the tax is 
levied on insurers, it will be passed on to employers and then to employees, and it is 
thereby likely to result in reduction in the generosity of insurance coverage for plans that 
exceed the thresholds.  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 14. 
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incentives of employers to provide excessively generous insurance, 
incentivizes employers to shop more aggressively for plans that are 
cost-effective, and encourages employees to choose those plans.  
Indeed the “tax” is really a device to remove a costly and market-
distorting tax benefit.83  The ACA can be seen as combating moral 
hazard in other ways as well.  Plans offered through exchanges will 
be structured in a manner that reflects the cost-saving incentives of 
co-payments and deductibles.  Thus, plans in the “precious metal” 
categories with relatively generous coverage (i.e., lower co-pays and 
deductibles) will have higher premiums.  In addition, although the 
ACA limits the level of out-of-pocket payments in plans, it sets those 
limits at the very high levels that current law sets for high-deductible 
plans under health savings accounts.  As a result, high-deductible 
plans may prove to be popular under the ACA’s rules requiring the 
purchase of health insurance.  An individual needs only to select a 
bronze level plan to avoid the individual mandate penalty and may 
purchase a catastrophic policy either if under age thirty or if no other 
plan is available for under eight percent of the individual’s household 
income.84 
The ACA takes some steps to address the political aspect of moral 
hazard identified by Professor Havighurst.  For example, the law 
discourages state mandates of benefits for plans participating in the 
exchange by requiring that any states that require benefits beyond the 
essential benefits package required by federal law must pay the 
additional cost of those benefits for individuals and families receiving 
federal subsidies.85  Although such mandates will still apply to plans 
marketed outside the exchange, this provision is likely to sharply 
 
83 See Jonathan Gruber, ‘Cadillac’ Tax Isn’t as Tax—It’s a Plan to Finance Real Health 
Reform, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2009/12/27/AR2009122701714.html (estimating the total cost to the Treasury of 
exclusion of employer contributions for health care to be $250 billion per year or twice the 
cost of providing universal care).  Critics of this provision argue that high-cost plans 
generally insure sicker employees and those in risky occupations or in regions with high 
medical costs.  Moreover critics assert that the money employers save by reducing health 
insurance coverage is unlikely to be passed on to employees for medically necessary as 
well as unnecessary services.  See TIMOTHY S. JOST & JOSEPH WHITE, CUTTING HEALTH 
CARE SPENDING: WHAT IS THE COST OF AN EXCISE TAX THAT KEEPS PEOPLE FROM 
GOING TO THE DOCTOR? (2010), available at http://www.ourfuture.org/files/Jost-White 
_Excise_Tax.pdf. 
84 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 68, at 120. 
85 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1311(d)(3)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. 119, 176 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West 
2010)); id. § 1334(c)(4), 124 Stat. at 904 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18054 (West 2010)). 
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curtail state benefit mandates, as states will likely be unwilling to 
impose costly mandates that may result in adverse selection and 
higher costs that will drive consumers away from choosing non-
exchange participating plans. 
As noted above, government policies, particularly payment 
methodologies, contribute significantly to the inefficiencies and 
distortions in the health care system.  The ACA undertakes prodigious 
efforts to redirect federal payment away from fee-for-service 
payment.  With many Medicare beneficiaries having complex health 
conditions and multiple co-morbidities, most observers agree that this 
system has significant cost and quality implications; the system 
provides no incentives for coordination of care, and it tolerates 
duplicative and costly provision of services.86  These payment 
policies have played an important role in encouraging and ossifying a 
fragmented delivery system.87  Thus, the ACA requires the Secretary 
of the HHS to establish, test, and evaluate a five-year pilot program 
“for integrated care during an episode of care . . . around a 
hospitalization in order to improve the coordination, quality, and 
efficiency of health care services.”88  Other reforms, many in the form 
of pilot programs or demonstrations, similarly attempt to rationalize 
government reimbursement so as to at least reduce the perverse 
incentives that have long plagued health care payment and delivery.89 
Finally, the ACA deals with a very significant public goods market 
failure—the underproduction of research and the inadequate 
dissemination of information concerning the effectiveness and quality 
of health care services and procedures.  The Act does so by 
subsidizing research and creating new entities to support such 
research90 and to disseminate information about outcomes and 
 
86 See Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chairman, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, 
Reforming the Health Care Delivery (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov 
/documents/20090310_EandC_Testimony_DeliveryReform.pdf. 
87 See HYMAN, supra note 51, at 21–22. 
88 ACA § 3023, 124 Stat. at 399 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4 (West 2010)). 
89 See, e.g., id. § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj (West 2010)) 
(establishing a shared saving program, which creates reimbursement incentives for groups 
of providers establishing accountable care organizations); id. § 3025, 124 Stat. at 408 
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (West 2010)) (creating a system that reduces payments 
to hospitals for excessive readmissions); id. § 3502, 124 Stat. at 513 (codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. § 256a-1 (West 2010)) (establishing a program to provide grants to community 
health teams to support medical homes aimed at coordinating care for patients with 
chronic illnesses and reimbursement through bundled payments). 
90 E.g., id. § 3013, 124 Stat. at 381–84 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. 
(West 2010)) (establishing a Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety charged 
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medically effective treatments.91  Numerous other provisions attempt 
to correct flaws in Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement 
methodologies, including those offering incentives to improve quality 
and induce reliance on “evidence-based medicine.”92 
B.  Delivery System Reform 
Considerable scholarship has identified fragmentation in health 
care delivery as a major source of inefficiency in the health care 
system.93  The harms flowing from fragmentation can be observed at 
the clinical level (inadequate care attributable to lack of provider 
coordination)94 and at the administrative level (high administrative 
and overall costs).95  The causes of fragmentation are multifaceted 
and intertwined but aptly summarized by Einer Elhauge: 
 
with identifying effective quality measures and best practices for treatment outcomes); id. 
§ 6301, 124 Stat. at 727–47 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.A. (West 
2010)) (establishing a Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute “to assist patients, 
clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health decisions by 
advancing the quality and relevance of evidence concerning the manner in which diseases, 
disorders, and other health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented, 
diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed through research and evidence synthesis that 
considers variations in patient subpopulations, and the dissemination of research findings 
with respect to the relative health outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of 
the medical treatments [and] services”); id. § 10303, 124 Stat. at 937–38 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2010)) (instructing the Secretary of the HHS to 
develop outcome measures for hospital physicians and to promote “best practices” in 
health care delivery); id. § 1204, 124 Stat. at 518 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300d-6 (West 
2010)) (providing grants for research in emergency medical care systems to  create 
“innovative models of regionalized, comprehensive, and accountable emergency care and 
trauma systems”); id. § 3501, 124 Stat. at 507–13 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 299b-33 to -
34 (West 2010)) (providing grants for research into improving health care delivery 
systems). 
91 See, e.g., id. § 3501, 124 Stat. at 508–11 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-
33 (West 2010)); id. § 6301, 124 Stat. at 738–39 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 
299b-37 (West 2010)). 
92 E.g., id. §§ 3001–08, 124 Stat. at 353–79 (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.A. (West 2010)) (establishing a value-based payment system for Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement). 
93 See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 50 
(discussing analyses by fourteen contributors of causes, effects, and remedies to excessive 
fragmentation in American health system). 
94 Cebul et al., supra note 50, at 38–43. 
95 Id. at 44–45 (citing administrative costs of thirty-one percent of total health care 
expenditures); Alain Enthoven, Curing Fragmentation with Integrated Delivery Systems: 
What They Do, What Has Blocked Them, Why We Need Them, and How to Get There from 
Here, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 50, at 65–68 (citing 
evidence of lower costs in prepaid multispecialty group practices). 
GREANEY 4/5/2011  3:15 PM 
2011] The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy 833 
The dominant cause of fragmentation . . . appears to be the law, 
which dictates many of the fragmented features [of the health 
system] . . . and thus precludes alternative organizational structures.  
The law is the culprit even though the payment system is also an 
important cause of health care fragmentation . . . .  The reason is 
that . . . the law dictates that payment system.96 
The ACA heeds Elhauge’s message by instituting new Medicare 
programs designed to reward integrated delivery of care.  Prominent 
among these programs is the Medicare “Shared Savings Program,” 
which will make groups of providers who voluntarily meet certain 
quality criteria eligible to share in the cost savings they achieve for 
the Medicare program.97  To qualify, these “accountable care 
organizations” (ACOs) must agree to be accountable for the overall 
care of a defined group of Medicare beneficiaries, to have sufficient 
participation of primary care physicians, to have processes that 
promote evidence-based medicine, to report on quality and costs, and 
to be capable of coordinating care.  Additionally, an ACO must be a 
group of providers and suppliers that has an established mechanism 
for joint decision making and may include practitioners (physicians, 
regardless of specialty; nurse practitioners; physician assistants; and 
clinical nurse specialists) in group practice arrangements, networks of 
practices, and partnerships or joint venture arrangements between 
hospitals and practitioners.  The Medicare program will pay the 
ACOs a global payment for all services needed or, alternatively, share 
savings based on comparing the ACOs’ cost to benchmark payments 
under traditional Medicare. 
The idea, which carries the endorsement of MedPAC and the 
influential health service researchers at Dartmouth,98 is not entirely 
novel.  Indeed, if this sounds a lot like the HMO managed care model, 
 
96 Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Fragmentation?, in THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 50, at 11. 
97 ACA § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395–99 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj (West 2010)). 
98 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 48, at 40–58; Elliott S. Fisher 
et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH 
AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE w219 (2009), available at http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/documents 
/publications/HA%20Fisher-McClellan%20art.pdf.  In addition, a number of experiments 
involving bundled payments to the ACOs and to other innovative organizations (as in 
Medicare’s Physician Group Practice demonstration) have been underway for some time.  
See, e.g., JIM HESTER ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE VERMONT 
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION PILOT: A COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEM TO 
CONTROL TOTAL MEDICAL COSTS AND IMPROVE POPULATION HEALTH (2010). 
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that’s because it is.99  In many respects the ACO is the latest in a long 
line of efforts to develop integrated delivery systems that bear 
financial responsibility for treatment decisions.  Benefiting from the 
nation’s experience with managed care, there are plausible, market-
based reasons for going in this direction.  Making entities accountable 
for care via capitation or global payments mitigates agency and 
information problems to some extent as providers are given economic 
incentives to economize care.100  Further, there is at least modest 
evidence from the managed care experience that these steps work to 
moderate cost while continuing to maintain quality of care.101  But to 
get there, the new law leaves much detail to the discretion of the 
Secretary of the HHS, who is presumably informed by experience and 
learning as the program progresses.  For example, the legislation 
delegates the development of standards for quality, use of evidence-
based medicine, and “patient-centeredness” to the HHS.102 
The ACA also seeks to spur competition by adjusting regulatory 
agency oversight in several areas.  For example, the ACA institutes 
changes to the mechanics of bidding for Medicare Advantage 
contracts that attempt to move the benchmark bidding process closer 
to a competitive model.  The ACA also expands competitive bidding 
for medical devices.103  Further, the ACA created an abbreviated 
approval pathway for biologic drugs that were “biosimilar,” or 
 
99 See KELLY DEVERS & ROBERT BERENSON, URBAN INST., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., CAN ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE THE VALUE OF HEALTH 
CARE BY SOLVING THE COST AND QUALITY QUANDARIES? 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411975_acountable_care_orgs.pdf (referring to the 
ACOs as “HMOs in drag”). 
100 See DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: 
FROM MARCUS WELBY TO MANAGED CARE 9–15 (2000). 
101 See David M. Cutler et al., How Does Managed Care Do It?, 31 RAND J. ECON. 
526, 526 (2000) (finding the HMOs have thirty percent to forty percent lower expenditures 
than traditional plans with little difference in outcomes). 
102 ACA § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj (West 2010)); see 
also 1 FURROW ET. AL., supra note 11, at 141–43, 154–57; Thomas L. Greaney, 
Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. e1 
(2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1013404. 
103 ACA § 6410, 124 Stat. at 773 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395m, 1395w-3 (West 
2010)) (expanding the Medicare competitive bidding program for durable medical 
equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies); see also Mike Lillis, Battle Continues 
over Medicare Competitive Bidding Program, HILL (July 2, 2010), http://thehill.com/blogs 
/healthwatch/medicare/107001-battle-continues-over-medicare-competitive-bidding           
-program (citing thirty-two percent cuts in purchases of durable medical equipment 
resulting from competitive bidding programs in nine cities and estimating that over 250 
members of the House of Representatives support repeal of the program). 
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interchangeable with previously approved biologics (“follow on” 
biologics).  Although the law was a precompetitive innovation, the 
law was subject to criticism from the Federal Trade Commission and 
others that it was unnecessarily protective of intellectual property 
rights by providing twelve years of market exclusivity to innovator 
biologics.104 
Finally, a number of proposals designed to foster competition were 
not enacted.  Noticeably absent is the creation of a “public option” 
insurance plan, a hotly debated reform, which proponents argued 
would introduce much-needed competition into concentrated 
insurance markets.105  However, the ACA gives states various options 
to create their own new insurance plans and mandates that the Office 
of Personnel Management contract with insurance carriers to assure 
that at least two “multistate plans” are offered in every health 
insurance exchange in each state.106  Another much-discussed reform, 
the partial repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson insurance exemption, 
garnered significant support but was nevertheless excluded in the 
ACA.107 
In sum, those painting health reform legislation as abandoning 
market-based values in health policy are mistaken.  The ACA 
undertakes enumerable steps designed to eliminate perverse 
incentives in government payment policies, to encourage 
development of a scientific and technological infrastructure 
 
104 A Federal Trade Commission report supported legislation that allows follow-on or 
biosimilar versions of biologic drugs, but it contended that the patent system would 
provide brand-name products all the protection they need without a period of exclusivity 
and that allowing for a period of patent exclusivity would be unnecessarily 
anticompetitive.  MICHAEL S. WROBLEWSKI, FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH 
CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION (2009). 
105 See Davenport and Sekhar, supra note 53 (discussing the public option plan debate). 
106 See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
107 On February 24, 2010, the House of Representatives passed by a margin of 406–18 
the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act, repealing in part the McCarran-
Ferguson Act’s applicability to health insurers by providing that (1) nothing in the act shall 
modify, impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to the 
business of health insurance, and (2) Federal Trade Commission Act prohibitions against 
using unfair methods of competition shall apply to the business of health insurance without 
regard to whether such business is carried on for profit.  Health Insurance Industry Fair 
Competition Act, H.R. 4626, 111th Cong. (2010).  A number of observers have argued 
that, notwithstanding the advisability of repealing the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, it 
has had little application in health care matters and its importance should not be 
overstated.  See, e.g., Chris Sagers, Much Ado About Probably Pretty Little: McCarran-
Ferguson Repeal in the Pending Health Reform Effort, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325 
(2010). 
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conducive to comparison shopping, and to spur development of 
delivery systems that can be accountable for cost and quality 
decisions.  So what could possibly go wrong? 
IV 
OBSTACLES TO INDUCING IMPROVED COMPETITIVENESS IN HEALTH 
CARE MARKETS 
A.  Regulation: Not Too Much but Not Too Little? 
The ACA’s capacity to unleash competitive forces to control cost 
and improve quality of care is contingent on a number of factors.  
First, much depends on regulations to be promulgated by the HHS 
and other agencies and the implementation of those regulations by the 
federal government and the states.  Administrative agencies will make 
a host of determinations crucial to the law’s scheme to improve the 
competitiveness of markets.  For example, the Secretary of the HHS 
is charged with establishing the criteria governing entry into exchange 
insurance markets.  Thus she will set standards for “qualified health 
plans,” ensuring that they adopt appropriate marketing practices, offer 
a sufficient choice of providers, afford access to essential community 
providers, and meet numerous other requirements.108  The Secretary 
is also required to enhance consumers’ opportunity for shopping for 
plans by developing a rating system that would rate qualified health 
plans offered through an exchange in each benefits level on the basis 
of the relative quality and price,109 and standardizing plans by 
identifying “essential benefits” that must be offered by each plan.110  
States are expected to undertake significant regulation, subject in 
many cases to regulatory standards set by the HHS.  For example, 
states are responsible for the complex and critical task of developing 
risk-adjustment programs.111  Significantly, the ACA gives the 
Secretary of the HHS considerable latitude to exercise her discretion 
as to the substance, timing, and extent of most of these regulations.112 
 
108 ACA § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173–82 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West 2010)). 
109 Id. § 1311(d), 124 Stat. at 176–78 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d) (West 2010)). 
110 Id. § 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 173–82 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West 
2010)). 
111 Id. § 1343, 124 Stat. at 212–13 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18063 (West 2010)). 
112 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS 
PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (P.L. 111-148) 3 
(2010) (describing twenty-six provisions of the ACA mandating “federal agencies to issue 
regulations that define certain terms, establish substantive requirements, create certain 
programs, and determine the timing of particular events”; eleven provisions that permit 
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Most of the key regulatory determinations will be made over a 
period extending to 2014 and beyond and are likely to be the subject 
of intense political controversy and debate.  The inevitably shifting 
political winds over this extended period of time113 are likely to 
influence regulators and legislators as they implement the ACA.114  
Political turbulence might well cause regulators to dilute some of the 
features of the reform bill that are critical to maintaining competitive 
markets.  For example, eliminating or weakening the individual 
mandate would likely cause severe disruptions in the insurance 
markets as a result of adverse selection.  Inadequate risk-adjustment 
mechanisms would likely also permit insurance markets to unravel.  
In addition, indifferent attention to buyers’ needs for standardization 
of choices and useable qualitative information will undermine the 
efficiency of comparative shopping. 
States are also expected to assume significant responsibilities in 
implementing health reform.115  For example, state legislative and 
regulatory actions are needed for setting up the local apparatus for 
new insurance markets, for implementing Medicaid expansion,116 and 
for enforcing the ACA’s requirements.117  Whether the law will 
 
such actions; and seven provisions that “appear to contemplate” such actions); see also 
Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The War Isn’t Over, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 
(2010), available at http://healthcarereform.nejm.org/?p=3223&query=home. 
113 The period from 2010 through the end of 2014 includes three congressional 
elections, a presidential contest, and cycles of state legislative and gubernatorial contests 
in every state. 
114 See Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 112 (predicting controversy over provisions 
that do not take effect until 2014, such as the insurance mandates, insurance subsidies for 
qualified families, Medicaid expansion, and the establishment of state health insurance 
exchanges). 
115 See Alan Weil & Raymond Scheppach, New Roles for States in Health Reform 
Implementation, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1178 (2010); see also RACHEL MORGAN, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATORS’ CHECK LIST FOR HEALTH 
REFORM IMPLEMENTATION FY2010 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents 
/health/2010CLHlthRef.pdf (listing dozens of provisions that require state legislative or 
administrative action or that merit state planning or consideration in fiscal year 2010).  See 
generally 2010 State Actions to Implement Federal Health Reform, NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20231 (last updated 
Jan. 5, 2011) (listing state legislation and executive orders implementing the ACA). 
116 Sara Rosenbaum, A “Customary and Necessary” Program—Medicaid and Health 
Care Reform, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1952 (2010). 
117 Professor Elizabeth Weeks Leonard aptly summarized the allocation of 
responsibility: “the Exchanges impose massive financial, administrative, and enforcement 
burdens on states to operate the new individual and small-group health insurance 
marketplace and coordinate with other specific ACA components.”  Elizabeth Weeks 
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succeed in inducing “cooperative federalism”—partnership between 
federal and state governments to implement the new law—is a matter 
of serious question.118  Given the strength of the “health reform 
nullification movement”119 and efforts to get courts to overturn vital 
provisions of the new law,120 there is a real possibility that some 
states may undertake half-hearted implementation efforts, provide 
limited funding, and make only lackadaisical enforcement efforts. 
On the other side of the coin is the real risk that reform will 
produce what Professor Havighurst has called in another context 
“hyper-regulation” of health insurance markets.121  That is, the far-
reaching regulatory provisions of the ACA might result in a 
regulatory regime that distorts markets through “excessive” consumer 
safeguards or that undermines the ability of payers and providers to 
offer alternatives that appeal to different consumer groups.122  For 
example, regulating network adequacy, specifying conditions of 
programs (e.g., “patient-centeredness”123), and dictating other terms 
 
Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Role of State Resistance in Health Care Decision-
Making, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 73 (2011). 
118 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).  The ACA contains numerous “cooperative federalism 
arrangements” for implementing reform, such as conditional funding, conditional 
preemption, block grants, and contractual arrangements between states and the federal 
government.  See Leonard, supra note 117, at 74. 
119 Leonard, supra note 117, at 3–9.  Five states have enacted resolutions stating that 
their citizens would not be required to comply with the ACA’s individual mandate, 
Missouri has passed a ballot measure prohibiting governments from mandating insurance, 
and lawmakers in over forty states have introduced bills asserting their States’ rights to opt 
out of implementation of the ACA or otherwise nullify some or all of its provisions.  Id.; 
see also Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health 
Reforms, 2010-2011, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18906 (last updated Mar. 22, 2011). 
120 As of this writing, twenty states have filed federal suits challenging the 
constitutionality of the ACA.  See Kevin Sack, Suit on Health Care Bill Appears Likely to 
Advance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, at A20. 
121 See Havighurst, supra note 21, at 90. 
122 See id. at 84 (arguing that “the dynamics of the political market for consumer-
protection regulation provide strong reasons to believe not only that standard-setting, 
command-and-control regulation systematically generates more social costs than benefits, 
but also that those costs are most likely to fall disproportionately on persons with lower 
incomes”). 
123 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3021, 
124 Stat. at 389–95 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2010)) 
(patient-centeredness as one standard for evaluating models under new innovation center 
in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services); id. § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395–99 
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj (West 2010)) (ACOs must meet patient-centeredness 
criteria to be established by the Secretary). 
GREANEY 4/5/2011  3:15 PM 
2011] The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy 839 
of private insurance may unduly limit choice, unfairly burdening low-
income groups with expenditures they may not otherwise choose to 
make.  As some have argued, preserving choice within limits along 
the dimensions of quality, convenience, and cost provides the raison 
d’être for maintaining a private system of health care financing.124 
Finally, one can safely predict that the ACA will give rise to 
unintended consequences (though identifying them is not so easy).125  
A key challenge for regulators will be to refrain from overprotective 
denials and to respond quickly to make necessary changes.  However, 
when legislation is needed,126 politics may intrude, and opponents 
may prefer to allow the statute’s flawed provisions to remain in effect 
rather than fix what they regard as a wholly wrongheaded and 
unconstitutional enterprise. 
B.  Concentrated Markets and Entry Barriers 
The high levels of concentration in hospital, specialty physician, 
and payer markets pose a serious problem for implementing reforms 
that rely on competition.  As described above, the ACA relies on two 
important innovations to promote competition.  First, it creates 
exchanges that will afford opportunities for comparative shopping by 
consumers and competition among health plans.  Second, it supports 
development of new delivery systems, such as ACOs and medical 
homes, that can integrate care and take responsibility for managing 
care under budgetary constraints.  Uncompetitive provider and payer 
markets may imperil both initiatives. 
Achieving cost savings from competition among payers requires 
provider market competition.  The effects of provider leverage on 
 
124 See Clark C. Havighurst, Why Preserve Private Health Care Financing?, in 
AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993). 
125 Academics and bloggers are lining up to predict such eventualities.  See, e.g., David 
A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Is Health Reform a “Game Changer?” 
(Univ. of Ill., Law and Econ. Research Paper No. LE10-010, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624311 (recognizing the risk that employers will drop health 
insurance when the ACA reforms are implemented in 2014); Amy Monahan & Daniel 
Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 
97 VA. L. REV. 125 (2011) (asserting that the ACA may induce employers to redesign their 
health plans to encourage employees who are likely to require extensive medical services 
to opt out of employer-provided coverage and instead acquire coverage from the 
individual market). 
126 See, e.g., Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 125, at 194–95 (describing the 
limitations of regulatory actions designed to correct the problem of employers dumping 
certain employees). 
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health costs are well documented,127 and there is little in the reform 
legislation designed to change things.  While returning insurers to the 
role of managing care can help mitigate the myriad market 
imperfections that complicate health care markets, it remains to be 
seen how effective regulations improving transparency, promoting 
evidence-based medicine, and curtailing insurance industry practices 
will be.  Further, enforcement of antitrust law offers no panacea for 
the problems sketched above.  Antitrust does not break up legally 
acquired monopolies or oligopolies, nor does it counter their exercise 
of market power through monopoly pricing, output restrictions, or 
quality degradation.  Thus, to a considerable extent, the horse is out of 
the barn as far as consolidation in physician, hospital, and insurance 
markets that has already occurred. 
To some commentators, embedded provider market concentration 
is an intractable problem that can be cured only by rate regulation.128  
An alternative approach recommends blending reliance on markets 
with steps to improve competition when possible and falling back on 
rate regulation when possible.  For example, Len Nichols has framed 
this approach as follows: 
 When prices are stuck far from the efficient cost level, policy 
makers have three basic tools at their disposal: 
(1) Change rules related to market entry and structure to engender 
more market competition (e.g., antitrust) 
(2) Use countervailing market buying power (monopsony) to 
counter local provider market power and resistance to change 
(3) Impose direct regulation of prices or specific behaviors of 
competitors.129 
 
127 See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text. 
128 See, e.g., Berenson et al., supra note 47. 
Unless market mechanisms can be found to discipline providers’ use of their 
growing market power, it seems inevitable that policy makers will need to turn to 
regulatory approaches, such as putting price caps on negotiated private-sector 
rates and adopting all-payer rate setting.  Indeed, some purchasers who believe 
strongly in the long-term merits of increased integration of care delivery believe 
that price regulation may be a prerequisite for payment reforms that encourage 
integration. 
Id. at 705; see also Bruce C. Vladeck & Thomas Rice, Market Failure and the Failure of 
Discourse: Facing Up to the Power of Sellers, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1306 (2009) 
(arguing that high prices in American health care are the result of a “fundamental 
imbalance in power between buyers and sellers”). 
129 Nichols, supra note 60, at 5. 
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Nichols’s proposal merits consideration.  However, given the 
difficulties associated with parts (1) and (2) of his concept, much of 
the burden may fall on item (3), rate regulation.  Regulators and 
enforcers can take steps to encourage new entry; however, their tools 
are limited.  While collusion to inhibit entry is actionable under 
antitrust law,130 CON laws, laws governing the scope of practice for 
allied health practitioners, and other regulatory limitations on 
provider competition are the product of state and federal law.  The 
ACA made no efforts to alter these limitations, and it is doubtful there 
is political will to do so.  Indeed, the ACA all but put an end to one 
source of new competition in hospital markets by banning new 
physician-owned hospitals that depend on Medicare 
reimbursement.131  Reliance on countervailing power is also open to 
question.  As a matter of economic theory132 and experience,133 
bilateral monopoly does not necessarily advance consumer welfare.  
Moreover, identifying the conditions in which bilateral monopoly 
should be encouraged (e.g., by countenancing otherwise 
anticompetitive mergers) is fraught with uncertainty. 
The structure of insurance markets also poses an obstacle to 
reliance on competition.  With one insurer controlling more than fifty 
 
130 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Two 
West Virginia Hospitals to End Illegal Market-Allocation Agreements (Mar. 21, 2005), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/208209.htm.  See 
generally 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, at 206–07 (describing cases challenging 
concerted action to limit competition through abuse of the CON process). 
131 The ACA essentially bans future development of physician-owned hospitals that 
depend on Medicare reimbursement by eliminating the Stark Law exception for physicians 
who do not have an ownership or investment interest and a provider agreement in effect as 
of December 31, 2010, and it sharply curtails the ability of existing facilities to expand.  
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6001, 124 Stat. 
119, 684–89 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (West 2010)); see also 1 FURROW 
ET AL., supra note 11, at 172. 
132 ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
124–67 (2010). 
133 A notorious example of cooperation between dominant firms involved the so-called 
“market covenant” between the CEOs of Partners Health Care, the dominant hospital 
system in Massachusetts, and the State’s largest insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) 
of Massachusetts.  As reported in The Boston Globe, BCBS agreed to a major payment 
increase for Partners, and in return, Partners “promised [it] would push for the same or 
bigger payment increases” from other insurers, thereby affording BCBS some insulation 
from competition from rival insurers.  Scott Allen et al., A Handshake That Made 
Healthcare History, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2008.  See generally Robert Pitofsky, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Thoughts on “Leveling the Playing Field” in Health Care 
Markets, Remarks Before the National Health Lawyers Association Twentieth Annual 
Program on Antitrust in the Health Care Field (Feb. 13, 1997). 
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percent of the market in seventeen states and at least twenty-two 
others states having two firms that dominate the market,134 much 
attention during the reform debate focused on improving the 
competitiveness of insurance markets.  Advocates claimed that 
offering a government-sponsored public plan option in each market 
would improve the dynamics of private plan competition in local and 
regional markets.  The competition-based argument for the public 
option rested on the dynamics of rivalry in concentrated markets.  
When insurers were unable or unwilling to effectively bargain for 
discounts with hospitals,135 the public plan would act as a “maverick” 
because it did not have incentives to go along with rivals that might 
be content to compete less vigorously. 
While the foregoing arguments did not carry the day, Congress did 
adopt two proposals ostensibly designed to inject new competition 
into private insurance markets.  The ACA authorizes the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) to enter into contracts with “multi-
state insurance plans” to offer individual or small group coverage 
through the exchanges.136  It requires the OPM to contract with at 
least two plans in each state, at least one of which must be a 
nonprofit.137  Second, the ACA authorizes federal grants and loans to 
encourage the creation of nonprofit, member-owned consumer 
insurance cooperatives.138  Cooperatives will be tax exempt, 
nongovernment entities, but they will be subject to a number of 
 
134 See Davenport and Sekhar, supra note 53. 
135 John Holahan explained the dynamic of hospital-payer bargaining as follows: 
In markets where there is little concentration among insurers but a concentrated 
hospital market, there is little ability to negotiate.  Where there is a dominant 
insurer, it is possible to do better and obtain discounts from hospitals, but they 
still have little negotiating power with dominant hospital systems.  In some 
markets, dominant insurers have no real incentive to be tough negotiators 
because they have no real competitors.  Small insurers lack bargaining power 
with providers and thus cannot significantly compete with larger insurers on 
premiums.  Finally, there is no real competition in many hospital markets 
because smaller hospitals have no ability to challenge the dominant system. 
John Holahan, Dir., Health Policy Ctr., The Urban Inst., Statement at the Hearing on 
Health Reform in the 21st Century: Proposals to Reform the Health System (June 24, 
2009). 
136 ACA § 10104, 124 Stat. at 902–06 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18054 
(West 2010)). 
137 The ACA empowers the Office of Personnel Management to negotiate with the 
plans concerning their medical loss ratio, profit margin, premium levels, and other terms 
and conditions as are in the interests of the enrollees.  Id. 
138 Id. § 1332, 124 Stat. at 203–06 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18052 (West 2010)). 
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regulatory restrictions.  The problem that both cooperative and 
multistate plans encounter is the obstacle that has stymied new 
entrants in the past: the entry barrier associated with obtaining 
provider discounts and assembling networks that will enable new 
plans to compete effectively with established incumbents.139 
V 
ACOS MAY BE THE ANSWER, BUT WHAT IS THE QUESTION? 
ACOs have garnered much attention.140  For many observers they 
hold out the prospect of rationalizing the delivery system by 
incentivizing providers to integrate their practices, make investments 
in technology and human capital, and ultimately change the way 
medicine is practiced.  Under this Panglossian account, ACOs can 
provide a vehicle for lowering cost and improving quality, not only in 
Medicare but in the private sector as well.  To meet the organizational 
and practical requirements of the ACA, providers will need to 
combine through merger or some other form of affiliation and make 
lasting commitments regarding their participation.  There are already 
anecdotal reports of a pending merger and acquisition wave prompted 
by hospitals and physicians that want to position themselves to form 
ACOs,141 even though, as of this writing, the HHS has yet to release 
rules or guidance. 
 
139 See Varney, supra note 56; see also Timothy S. Jost, Are Cooperatives a 
Reasonable Alternative to a Public Plan?, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (June 15, 2009), 
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/06/15/jost-on-cooperatives (questioning the 
viability of cooperatives but allowing that they could succeed with “concerted and 
probably long-lasting support from the federal government”). 
140 See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www 
.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/14/091214fa_fact_gawande; Reed Abelson, A New 
Concept in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2010/07/28/a-new-concept-in-health-care (recognizing ACOs as “one of the hottest 
concepts to emerge from the discussions about how best to overhaul the nation’s health 
care system”).  For less sanguine views, see Jeff Goldsmith, The Accountable Care 
Organization: Not Ready for Prime Time, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009), http: 
//healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/08/17/the-accountable-care-organization-not-ready-for-prime 
-time (“The problem with this movie is that we’ve actually seen it before, and it was a 
colossal and expensive failure.”).  See also Joe Carlson, ACOs: A Mystery of Biblical 
Proportions, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.modernhealthcare.com 
/article/20100809/NEWS/308099959. 
141 See Caralyn Davis, Investors Expect Healthcare M&A Uptick Through 2Q 2011, 
FIERCE HEALTHFINANCE (July 21, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com 
/story/investors-expect-healthcare-m-uptick-through-2q-2011/2010-07-21#ixzz0zZ6q 
ZLVp (predicting a sharp increase in consolidation among providers resulting from health 
reform). 
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From the perspective of the topic of this Article, a key issue is 
whether the movement to form ACOs will advance the competitive 
model or retard it.  To a considerable extent, ACOs mirror the pro-
competitive potential that HMOs brought to the table during the 
managed care era.  That is, the ACO can serve as a locus of 
responsibility, accountable for maintaining quality and using 
evidence-based medicine and operating under financial incentives to 
control costs.  As such, employers and insurers will be able to shop, 
compare, and bargain with ACOs to get the best deal for their 
insureds.  Indeed, because they assume risk, ACOs can reduce the 
role of the insurer/middleman, offering presumed benefits to both 
providers and consumers who are suspicious of the insurance 
industry.  But at the same time, the path of ACO development could 
prove profoundly anticompetitive.  One concern flows from what 
might come to be called the “2010 Health Reform Merger Wave”—a 
rush to consolidation induced in part by hospitals and physicians 
wanting to be assured they will be in a strong bargaining position.142  
As hospitals buy up or otherwise affiliate with physician practices, as 
physician practices merge, and as hospitals merge with rivals, there 
may be little room for formation of competing ACOs in many 
markets.  Whether the HHS will use its regulatory authority to 
discourage over-inclusive ACOs is still an open question.143  
Although the ACA contemplated that Medicare ACOs also serve the 
private insurance industry,144 it gave no guidance as to whether the 
HHS should attempt to preserve conditions that are conducive to 
competition among ACOs.  Thus, although ACOs are potentially the 
most potent mechanism for systemic change in the new law, Congress 
neglected to specifically charge the HHS with the responsibility for 
assuring that the Shared Savings Program does not enhance or 
entrench provider market power. 
 
142 See Robert Pear, As Health Law Spurs Mergers, Risks Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
21, 2010, at A1. 
143 Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. e1 (2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056 
/NEJMp1013404; Robert F. Leibenluft, ACOs and the Enforcement of Fraud, Abuse, and 
Antitrust Laws, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 99 (2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi 
/full/10.1056/NEJMp1011464. 
144 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10307, 124 
Stat. 119, 941 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a (West 2010)) (stating that the 
Secretary of the HHS “may give preference to the ACOs who are participating in similar 
arrangements with other payers”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The interplay between competition and regulation has a long 
history in American healthcare.  This Article has argued that, 
although the ACA takes important steps toward improving the 
prospects for competition, political and practical obstacles stand in the 
way of realizing that end.  As we approach the forty-fifth anniversary 
of the passage of the last major health care reform in America, the 
adoption of Medicare and Medicaid, can one now say which side—
competition or regulation—has prevailed?  As Zhou En-lai answered 
when asked about the effect of the French Revolution, the answer 
seems to be “it’s too soon to tell.”145 
 
145 SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, at xiii 
(1989). 
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